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Abstract
Title of Dissertation: Analysis of Nigeria’s Deep Blue Project: A New Paradigm for
Maritime Security in The Gulf of Guinea.
Degree:

Master of Science

In a bid to holistically tackle the security challenges within Nigeria’s maritime domain
and by extension the Gulf of Guinea, the Nigerian government launched the Integrated
National Security and Waterways Protection Infrastructure, also known as the Deep
Blue Project in 2019. This study analyses Nigeria’s Deep Blue Project as a maritime
security intervention, to determine a number of issues including: its alignment as an
ideal maritime security framework; areas that need improvement; as well as the aspects
of the project which could be adopted into the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) collective efforts
to enhance maritime security in the region.
Findings reveal that the DBP substantially aligns with maritime security frameworks
obtained in some jurisdictions around the world, inasmuch as there exist areas that
require improvement to meet global best practices. The research also shows that the
pre-existing Yaoundé Architecture deals more with information sharing, hence, there
is not yet an existing adequate asset contribution between GoG states to effectively
tackle the security challenges in the region.
Taking Nigeria’s Deep Blue project as a model, the research concludes that one nation
cannot shoulder maritime security operations alone, hence, GoG states’ regional
collaboration would be best achieved if there is asset/personnel contribution by all
stakeholders, and by using marine asset tag technology, make their assets readily
available for deployment when the need arises, especially, within their respective
maritime domains.

KEYWORDS: Maritime Security, Deep Blue Project, Distress, Domain Awareness,
C4i, Nigeria, Strait of Malacca, Gulf of Aden, NIMASA, IMO.
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Chapter 1.
1.1 Introduction/Background.
The sea has been regarded as a zone of insecurity and danger through the course of
human history. It is a source of threats such as piracy, robbery, transnational organized
crime, terrorism, environmental degradation among others, from the time of
colonialism to globalization (Bueger and Edmunds, 2017). Some literature has shown
the issue of security to be core to human existence. It means to be free from fear or
danger (Jackson-Preece, 2011). According to the Merriam-Webster (1828) dictionary,
“security is the state or quality of being secure; such as freedom from anxiety, fear and
danger”. An appreciation of how security is defined and deployed in general
international relations is key to understanding the term maritime security. Depending
on who is using the term and the context, maritime security could have different
meanings. For example, to shipping industry operators, maritime security is specific
about the maritime transport system as it relates to safety of cargo and its destination
without intrusion or being hampered by criminal activities (Klein, 2011). This is due
to the high vulnerability this mode of transport is subject to, with respect to piracy,
terrorist attack and other hostile actions internationally, hence, the need for security in
maritime transport (Papa, 2013).

Maritime security can also be understood as a concept pointing towards maritime
domain awareness, or as a set of measures, operations, regulations and policies geared
towards maritime domain security (Germond, 2015). This view is more
comprehensive, in that it reflects almost all the aspects and strategies in maritime
security engagements. Maritime security from a defence perspective, encompasses a
greater range of threats than the notion of sea supremacy. (Klein, 2011). Most studies
tend to merge the issues of maritime safety and security together, however, there exist
sharp differences. While the former is talking about prevention of damage by accident
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or natural factor, the latter is particular about prevention of damage by human factor,
for example; acts of sabotage, terrorism, subversion, piracy, and the protection of the
maritime domain against other international unlawful acts by a combination of
preventive and responsive measures (AMSSA, 2019; Feldt et al., 2013). Maritime
security efforts have global standards. Key to effective operation of all programs in
maritime security is timely and accurate information. The September 9/11 2001
tragedy has shown the importance, and enhanced maritime security by increased
international stakeholders’ acceptance, more widely and improved maritime threats
information dissemination, as well as heightened security awareness among
stakeholders in the maritime sector (Johnstone, 2015).

Maritime transportation is an indispensable instrument for global trade, as it connects
producers, manufacturers and consumers worldwide (Cicek et al., 2019). According
to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 2002, over
90% of the world’s commerce takes place through the sea. The issue of maritime
security has been brought to the fore in order to raise consciousness about the sea, as
a major line of communication, world’s food source, as well as industrial raw materials
among others (Eluwa & Rana, 2011). (David & John, 2006)

International maritime transport had witnessed a prosperous period characterized by
the growing market integrations, with advances in technology and international trade
flow globalization within the second half of the 20th century. Unfortunately, there has
been disruptions of these achievements due to terrorist attacks with its negative
implications (Papa, 2013). This threat is close to four decades old. For instance, an
Italian cruise ship, MS Achille Lauro, was hijacked on October 7, 1985, which was
regarded as a significant act of terrorism. As a result of that incident, the International
Maritime Organization (IMO) adopted, “Measures to prevent unlawful acts which
threaten the safety of ships and the security of their passengers and crews”, Resolution
A. 584(14). Before and since, there were equally other notable maritime insecurity
incidents which include among others; a cruise ship, SS Santa Maria hijacking on
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January 23, 1961, in La Guairá, Venezuela; attack on a Navy ship, USS Cole, on the
10th June, 2000, in the Yemeni port of Aden; and the attack on a VLCC oil tanker,
M/V M. Star, on the 27th July, 2010, in the Gulf of Persia. The MS Achille Lauro
incident also prompted the adoption of the Convention for the suppression of unlawful
Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA), 1988 as amended. The SUA
convention ensures that “appropriate action is taken against persons committing
unlawful acts against ships, including acts of violence against persons on board ships,
seizure of ships by force, or the placing of devices on board which are capable of
damaging or destroying the ship” (IMO, 2019).

The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974 as amended,
is a maritime regulatory regime, which covers special measures to enhance maritime
security, as well as the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) in its
Chapter XI-2. This was in sharp response to the devastating acts of terrorism of
September 11, 2001, at the United States of America, and the need to protect the
international maritime transport against terrorism (IMO, 2019; Hesse and
Charalambous, 2004), and owing to the importance of international security, hence,
the need for initiatives, mandates, regulations, geared towards security by
governments (Kim et al., 2008).

1.2 Geographical Area of Study:
Nigeria is one of the most well-known developing countries in the world, Africa’s
most populated country, as well as West Africa’s biggest country, with an area of
356,669 square miles (Falola, 2001). According to the World Population Review,
2022, Nigeria has a population of 216,908,161 million people, the largest in Africa.
Nigeria’s coastline is approximately 853km, facing the Atlantic Ocean, and lies
between Latitude 4010’ to 6020’N and Longitude 2045’ to 8035’E, having four distinct
geomorphic units, and a maritime area of about 46,000km2, with diverse and
significant natural marine resources (Nwilo and Badejo, 2005; Awosika and

3

Folorunsho, 2021; Ateme, 2021). To the North, Nigeria is bordered by Republics of
Chad and Niger, to the East by the Republic of Cameroon, to the West by the Republic
of Benin, and the Atlantic Ocean to the South (Nwilo and Badejo, 2005). According
to the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Decree 1978, Nigeria’s EEZ is 200 nautical
miles, about 210,900km2 from the baselines, measuring from Nigeria’s territorial
waters (United Nations, 1978; Zubbey et al., 2019).

Figure 1. Nigeria within the Gulf of Guinea. Source: (Africa Centre for Strategic Studies, 2015).

As shown in Fig. 1., Nigeria can be seen to be strategically located in the Gulf of
Guinea, as well as in the international seaborne trade. As a strategic player in the
international seaborne trade, Nigeria is also a stabilizer in regional maritime security
owing to her contributions to regional and global peacekeeping, as well as her military
might, and have made several efforts, including developing some counter-piracy and
other security measures and initiatives, towards vigorous responses to her maritime
security challenges and by extension, the Gulf of Guinea (Onuoha, 2012).
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1.3 Problem Statement:
Nigeria, and indeed the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) have in recent times battled with the
spate of maritime insecurity, especially, piracy attacks, and other forms of transnational organized crimes, which has portrayed the country, as well as the region as
hotspots in the international maritime community. This has negatively affected Nigeria
in particular, as her maritime domain has been tagged, "war-risk" zone, resulting in
high insurance premiums and some other undesirable consequences. Nigeria is
regarded as the microcosm of the GoG, and to a large extent the African continent
(Onuoha, 2012; Paterson, 2007). According to Gilpin, 2007, the Gulf of Guinea (GoG)
maritime security arrangements are under-resourced, and have scanty policy attention.
Recently, a paradigm shift has been suggested through a number of national and
regional initiatives, as countries in Africa, non-governmental organizations,
commercial entities, as well as other stakeholders, gradually recognize the wideranging benefits of enhanced maritime security.

While countries in the region are willing to cooperate in maritime insecurity tackling
efforts, there exists a problem of inadequate information about the extent and nature
of maritime crimes, and also, the dearth of legal instruments to address these
challenges (Otto, 2016). Among other things, there has been neglect on some serious
security measures, especially, with respect to intelligence gathering (Temitope et al.,
2020). According to Jacobsen, 2017, maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea is highly
complex and involves issues like inadequate military equipment, legal deficiencies, as
well as challenges like corruption and multiplicity of foreign responders. Suffice it to
say that the above submissions confirm that there has not been a sufficient practical
integrative approach or measures towards solving the issue of maritime insecurity in
the Gulf of Guinea over the years, but more an example perhaps, of a collaborative or
integrative theory, which has not yielded much positive or indeed expected results.
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1.4 Deep Blue Project Description:
The Integrated National Security and Waterways Protection Infrastructure, popularly
known as the Deep Blue (DB) Project, is a maritime security intervention project of
the Federal Government of Nigeria. Started in August, 2019, and launched officially
on June 10th, 2021, the DB project is complimenting already existing maritime security
architectures in Nigeria (NIMASA, 2021). The need to develop a vigorous maritime
security architecture towards a comprehensive solution to maritime insecurity in
Nigeria and the Gulf of Guinea by extension, which will comprise civil, military and
paramilitary authorities, for better synergy, gave rise to the Deep Blue Project. The
project is domiciled and implemented by the Nigerian Maritime Administration and
Safety Agency (NIMASA), and is acting on behalf the Federal Ministry of
Transportation (FMoT), with partners drawn from the Nigerian Navy (NN), Nigerian
Airforce (NAF), Nigerian Police Force (NPF), Department of State Security Services
(DSSS) and Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA). The components of the
Deep Blue project include; trained civil and military personnel, a Command, Control,
Communication, Computers and Intelligence (C4i) Operation Centre, comprising C4i
Systems, Intelligence System, Aerial Mission Management System and Satellite
Communication (Satcom). Other components are Falcon Eye liaison unit, helicopters,
interceptors, special mission aircraft, special mission vessel, armoured vehicle, as well
as intervention team.
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Figure 2. Deep Blue Project Components. Source: (Created by Author).
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Nigeria’s Deep Blue project is an integrated maritime security infrastructure consisting
of trained civil and military personnel. Its main operational components include the
Command, Control, Communication, Computer and Intelligence (C4i) Centre, as well
as the marine, air and land assets. The C4i Centre serves as the operational nucleus of
the DB project and works on a 24/7-hour basis, with personnel on real-time
observatory watch on the security systems, codenamed the C4i and Intelligence
systems, with the aim of identifying and coordinating response to maritime security
threats, as well as other suspicious activities within the Nigeria’s Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ), Latitude: 4˚4’ 11 8˚N (4.06995728˚), Longitude: 4˚45’ 23 1˚E
(4.75640951˚), and the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) by extension. The DB project could be
seen as partly addressing, according to Okoronkwo et al., 2014, the Nigerian maritime
environment’s inclusion in the piracy hotlist, which in turn has become of major
interest to security stakeholders, policy makers as well as researchers. There is also the
need for strong synergy between security agencies, to enhance maritime security
management and intelligence. The limitations faced as a result of operational mandates
of the various military arms, as well as civilian authorities charged with the duty of
securing Nigeria’s maritime domain are taken care of within the DB project. It is aimed
at ensuring security in Nigeria’s maritime domain for safe and secure shipping, as well
as averting economic sabotage.
Also, the DB project of Nigeria can be seen as appropriately responding to the call by
the International Maritime Organization (IMO), for States to take measures to prevent
unlawful acts against ships as obtained in Resolution A.584(14), adopted 20th
November 1985, which spelt out, “measures to prevent unlawful acts which threaten
the safety of ships and security of their passengers and crew”, and particularly,
resolution A. 545(13) of 17th November, 1983, which “urges Governments to take, as
a matter of highest priority, all measures to prevent and suppress acts of piracy and
armed robbery against ships in or adjacent to their waters, including strengthening of
security measures” (IMO, 2019).
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1.5 Aims of the Research:
The aim of this research is to examine what goes into an ideal maritime security
structure, develop a theoretical model of good maritime security framework, analyse
data from the DB project to see if it aligns with the framework, as well as compare
with maritime security efforts or initiatives from other jurisdictions of the world with
similar maritime security challenges as Nigeria. This will help identify areas that need
to be improved upon within the DP project, in sync with global best practices, and
recommend as appropriate, its model for adoption in the overall GoG maritime security
operations.

1.6 Objectives of the Research:
The research objectives are formulated below;

1. To identify and analyse the merits and demerits of the Deep Blue project as a
maritime security intervention.

2. Benchmark the DB project against an ideal maritime security framework and
compare with some jurisdictions with similar security challenges or best
management practices, and recommend the optimization of the DB project for
more efficiency, and in sync with global best practices.

3. Identify practical areas of the DBP which could be adapted into the GoG
collaborative maritime security efforts with a view to improving its
effectiveness.

1.7 Research Questions:
The questions hinged on this research includes;
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1. How is the Deep Blue project tackling existing security challenges in Nigeria’s
maritime domain?
2. What are the components and strategies of the DB project which compares with
an ideal maritime security infrastructure and best practices as identified in other
jurisdictions and globally?

3. How can the DB project be enhanced and optimized in its contribution to
maritime security in Nigeria, and the Gulf of Guinea by extension?

1.8 Significance of Study:
According to Buegar and Edmunds, 2017, maritime security has been theorized and
seen from a rather conservative point of view, hence, the need for a paradigm shift for
maritime security. This theory could mean the existing cooperation between the States
in the Gulf of Guinea in terms of regular meetings and deliberations, and not the actual
deployment of adequate equipment, machinery, as well as human resources both
individually or jointly, to effectively tackle shared maritime security challenges among
the littoral states. Examination of ways by which stakeholders in the Gulf of Guinea
have responded towards these challenges in practice, with particular focus on maritime
domain awareness, as well as field operations will reveal how far the regular meetings
of the GoG States and their willingness to cooperate have actually addressed GoG
maritime insecurity.
The development of an Integrated National Security and Waterways Protection
Infrastructure, otherwise known as the Deep Blue Project by Nigeria, seeks to
introduce a new model or agenda, which is more practical in tackling maritime security
challenges within Nigeria’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), and the Gulf of Guinea
by extension. The maritime environment has an interlinked complex security system
which also incorporates strong land and sea connections (Buegar & Edmund, 2017),
hence, the need for adoption of the Deep Blue Project model to serve as the GoG model
for maritime security, incorporating various maritime stakeholders and ensuring
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unified practical approach and deployment of necessary equipment and human
resources in tackling maritime security challenges within the GoG. Also, analysis of
the DB project’s effectiveness since inception, and comparing with the efforts of other
jurisdictions with similar challenges as Nigeria and the GoG, would help reveal how
best to consolidate the project, both at the national and regional levels, for an efficient
solution to maritime insecurity within Nigeria and the GoG region.

1.9 Scope and Limitations:
There was some difficulty in accessing certain data to further illustrate some aspects
of the research from the Deep Blue project, being a national waterway security project,
hence, its sensitive nature, as it affects national security. Also, the Deep Blue project,
being a new project in the Nigerian maritime security architecture commissioned in
the year 2019, and officially launched in the year 2021, does not have much scholarly
literature yet or previous research carried out on its operations, hence, the limitation
of sufficient literature on its operations subsists. Another potential limitation was
unease of access to some vital security information from some selected jurisdictions
for comparative purposes.

1.10

Methodology of the Research:

Basically, this research uses Qualitative Research method, that is to say, “research
using methods such as participant observation, as well as case studies, which shows
narrative or descriptive account of a practice or setting” (Drislane & Parkinson, 2011).
This ensured the identification of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats
(SWOT) (Gurel, 2017) of the Deep Blue Project, and how best the GoG could adopt
the model for a practical and enhanced approach to maritime security within the
region.
Also, based on the research questions, a mixed method was also applied in this
research. It comprises qualitative, legal, and quantitative research methods. The legal,
governance and technical frameworks of a good maritime security infrastructure was
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analysed against the strategies of the Deep Blue project. Also, integrative literature
reviews which show best management practices from other jurisdictions e.g., the US,
Gulf of Aden or Strait of Malacca, with similar cases as the Gulf of Guinea, was used.

1.11

Sources of Data:

The primary source of data for this research was sourced from the Command, Control,
Computer, Communication and Intelligent (C4i) Centre of the Deep Blue Project
domiciled in the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA),
and also features some data from the International Maritime Bureau (IMB). Also, this
research explores data from some published and unpublished reports and surveys, as
well as narrative and descriptive experiences by some staff of the NIMASA C4i Centre
and selected maritime security stakeholders in Nigeria, Gulf of Guinea, and around the
world.
This research also features some information gathered through contacting via zoom
with some maritime security personnel engaged in the Gulf of Aden and Strait of
Malacca.

1.12

Research Approach:

This research approach was taken in order to ensure accurate records/figures of
activities in the Deep Blue Project since inception, between 2019-2022, as to analyse
the impact of the project since inception in the overall maritime security efforts in
Nigeria and the Gulf of Guinea. This enabled me to get authoritative answers to the
existing procedures in the DB Project, the various components and mode of operation
from the managers, as well as personal discussions with other C4i personnel,
stakeholders, among others. Also relying on experience as a staff of NIMASA to
analyse the whole submissions. The use of case studies, scholarly articles enabled me
to give a good narrative and description of asset types, capabilities, as well as possible
interoperability between countries or littoral states in the Gulf of Guinea.
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1.13

Research Data Limitation:

The research relied majorly on the data the C4i Centre of the Deep Blue Project were
willing to give, due to some standing administrative procedure in the Agency on data
protection. However, the data gathered were of immense help to this research. Also,
currently, there is no known available literature that has comprehensively discussed
Nigeria’s Deep Blue project yet.
Also, most maritime security information is restricted in the selected jurisdictions,
hence, it is difficult to extract more data for in-depth explanation of the research.
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Chapter 2.
Literature Review.
2.1 Maritime Security, Historical Perspective:
The high seas are open to ships from all countries, both landlocked and coastal, to
support economic activities and international trade, as well as to facilitate contacts
among people, and the use of natural resources in a responsible manner. In recent
years, however, criminal groups have been exploiting the freedom of navigation,
hence, the sea has changed from a space where freedom existed, to a shared, vast but
fragile environment (Fedotov, 2019; Feldt et al., 2013). The sophistication of
transnational criminal activities and maritime crimes are increasingly expanding, both
in types and sizes, hence, pose a threat to international peace and security, as well as
threaten people’s lives and safety, human rights, and sustainable development
(Fedotov, 2019; Bruwer, 2020).

There exists no general definition of maritime security. It is broad, a focus area which
is somewhat amorphous, a coherent definition is difficult to determine. (Feldt et al.,
2013; Potgieter, 2012). The phrase, “maritime security”, was coined towards the
twentieth century when States’ intervention at sea expanded, and on the recognition
that the sea possesses more value for humanity than what was the previous
understanding. More recently, the seas have been recognised by states as a new frontier
for economic development, hence, they prioritize security in their territorial waters and
other maritime zones, which is also a way of contributing to good order on the high
seas (Bueger, 2015; Otto, 2020). To many observers, maritime security appears to be
a large and unclear concept. The threats which prevail in the maritime domain prompts
discussions in the line of maritime security. It elevates understandings about global
existential threats, hence, many entities, from international, private and public sectors
are involved, with the aim of maintaining good governance at sea, defending and
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facilitating commerce, and preserving freedom at seas (Feldt et al., 2013; Bueger,
2015; Ryan, 2019).

There are many faces to maritime security challenges which include; piracy and armed
robbery, illicit trafficking by sea, maritime terrorism, human trafficking, small arms
and light weapons trafficking, cargo theft among others (Feldt et al., 2013). Illegal,
Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing, unlawful and intentional damage to the
marine environment, illegal dumping or discharge of pollutants by vessels are also
threats to the maritime domain (Kraska and Pedrozo, 2013). One of the oldest threats
to maritime security is piracy. It was believed to have been eradicated by the 1830s in
most of the world’s oceans, with the exception of some parts of Asia. From the late
twentieth century and early twenty-first century, it has emerged again as a significant
threat to international maritime security and safety (Otto and Jernberg, 2020). These
challenges may be hybrid in nature, and keeps evolving; an unpredictable and
interconnected mix of irregular and traditional warfare, organized crime, and/or
terrorism. The nature of IUU fishing as a security concern is exhibited by reference to
its operational synergies with crime, as well as its impacts on human communities
(Feldt et al., 2013; Rosello, 2020).

Figure 3. Pirates attacking a vessel. Source: (Dryad Global, 2022).
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Maritime insecurity, especially the threat posed by piracy, as well as armed robbery
against ships, have been on the International Maritime Organization’s agenda since
the early 1980s. Between the late 1990s and early 2000, the South China sea was the
focus, including the Strait of Malacca and Singapore. In recent times, since 2005, the
IMO has focused on the piracy in the Gulf of Aden, off the Somali coast and the Indian
ocean. Currently, the IMO is implementing a strategy for maritime security
enhancement in West and Central Africa, in sync with the maritime security
agreements of the region (IMO, 2019). Also, a key issue on the maritime security
agenda is maritime terrorism. This first came to international attention due to the
Achille Lauro attack in 1985, and more recently, the 9/11, 2001, attacks on the Twin
Tower and Pentagon in the United States of America (Otto et al., 2020).

On the other hand, there has been increasing interest in the issues bothering on
Cybersecurity and maritime security over the past few years. There exist clear and
critical points of intersection between the two security problems, but little attention
has been paid to their combination (Kapalidis, 2020). According to Sadique et al.,
2018, as cited by Obaidant et al., 2020, there are three basic security requirements,
“confidentiality, integrity and availability”, commonly called CIA triad. Organizations
or individuals involved are impacted if any one of these basic requirements is lost.
New and unexpected vulnerabilities can spring up due to the increasing international
maritime community dependence on cyberspace, as well as heavy reliance on
information and online systems (Kapalidis, 2020).

Maritime security operation is the responsibility of a government. To act on behalf of
a state involves sovereign decision to pursue different options (Feldt et al., 2013)
According to Kraska and Pedrozo, 2013, maritime security involves law enforcement,
irregular, clandestine and special forces operations, as well as conventional military
forces. Agencies and departments are linked with the air and ground elements of the
joint armed forces; the coast guard, naval, marine police, other coastal and marine
forces, including fisheries and oceanographic services, the intelligent community, as
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well as international partners. These aforementioned organizations usually belong to
the government of each state, and have the following maritime security elements
mandate;


Sea crime security protection



Resource security, access to sea resources up to the seabed



All seafarers and fishermen security



Environmental protection



Sea lines of communication security



Political independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity



International and national peace and security (Feldt et al., 2013).

Maritime security is very important for the sustainability and growth of commerce
globally, especially those conducted through the sea. Nigeria is challenged with some
security issues on her maritime domain such as; piracy, armed robbery, human
trafficking,

stowaways,

theft/pilferage

among

others,

and

have

initiated

intergovernmental partnerships at both national and regional levels towards
enhancement of maritime security. (Onwuegbuchunam et al., 2021). The Gulf of
Guinea (GoG) is currently notorious as one of the most dangerous globally, in
comparison to the Malacca Straits and the Gulf of Aden. Maritime Security in the GoG
region is widely acknowledged to be highly complex, involving a lot of issues which
among others include; corruption, legal deficiencies, youth unemployment, political
unrest, as well as inadequate military equipment. This portends a grave danger to the
prosperity and stability of countries within the region. Countries in the region so far
are unable to develop a coherent and cogent maritime security policy, framework or
strategy to tackle the menace effectively (Ukeje and Ela, 2013; Jacobsen, 2017). High
degree socioeconomic vulnerability is reflected in hostile acts against ships and
seafarers. Hostile maritime acts could cause increase in political and social instability,
as well as financial losses (Mazaris, 2017), hence, a significant issue in the present
world order (Joy, 2021).
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2.2 International Regulatory Frameworks on Maritime Security:
2.2.1 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS):
The UNCLOS is regarded as the “constitution of the oceans”, hence, the nucleus of a
complex regime consisting of various conventions on port and flag state duties,
environmental regulation, trans-national organized crime and counterterrorism
(Edwards et al., 2021). At the time of its adoption in 1982, the UNCLOS pre-empted
low-intensity conflict pattern shifts of the late 1990s through encompassing several
new security challenges. These included; illegal immigration, human trafficking,
piracy, as well as environmental security (Williams, 2015). The UNCLOS addresses
piracy in the Article 100, “Duty to cooperate in the repression of piracy”, which states;
“All states shall cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of
piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any
state” (United Nations, 1982).
Several other articles regulating response by states against piracy and associated
crimes are contained in Articles 101 to 107 and 110 (Williams, 2015). Within the
UNCLOS, the concept of “maritime security” captures many of the aforementioned
challenges in three dimensions;


Terrorism and extremist violence at sea,



Transnational organized crimes at sea, also known as “blue crime”, including;
maritime piracy, irregular migration, smuggling of narcotics and other illicit
goods, deliberate pollution and illegal fishing,



Inter-state challenges, including contested territorial claims, inter-state border
and resource disputes, as well as grey zone operations (Edwards et al., 2021).

By ratifying the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), all
States Parties have a responsibility in maritime security (Feldt et al., 2013).
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2.2.2 Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA):
The Suppression of Unlawful Acts (SUA) Treaties, adopted in 1988, provides
international legal framework which stipulate appropriate actions to be taken against
persons committing unlawful acts against a ship (IMO, 2019). In order to fill the voids
in international law needed to combat other threats to human life, security of
commerce and navigation at sea, which are not fully prescribed under UNCLOS, and
ensure appropriate action is taken against persons committing unlawful acts against
ships, the SUA convention and protocol was drafted and agreed in the year 1988 (IMO,
2019; Williams, 2015). Suffice it to say that the SUA Treaty contains the overarching
actions, within the context of maritime security challenges, that states need to take.

The list of offences, according to Article 3 of the SUA convention states;
“Any person who commits an offence, if that person unlawfully and
intentionally;

(a) seizes or exercises control over a ship by force or threat thereof or any other
form of intimidation; or
(b) performs an act of violence against a person on board a ship, if that act is
likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship; or
(c) destroys a ship or causes damage to a ship or to its cargo which is likely to
endanger the safe navigation of that ship; or
(d) places or causes to be placed on a ship, by any means whatsoever, a device
or substance which is likely to destroy that ship, or cause damage to that ship
or its cargo which endangers or is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that
ship; or
(e) destroys or seriously damages maritime navigation facilities or seriously
interferes with their operation, if any such act is likely to endanger the safe
navigation of a ship; or
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(f) communicates information which he knows to be false, thereby endangering
the safe navigation of a ship; or
(g) injures or kills any person, in connection with the commission or the
attempted commission of any of the offences set forth in paragraphs (a) to (f)”
(United Nations, 1988).

This list of criminal offenses established by Article 3 requires Contracting
Governments or State Parties implementation by means of national legislation, by
prosecution or extradition (IMO, 2019).
In 2005, the 1988 SUA Convention and Protocol was amended to become the 2005
SUA Convention and Protocol. It adds new Articles “3bis”, containing three new
categories of offenses namely;


Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) on the high seas,



Using a ship as a means for committing terrorist acts or as a weapon,



Transportation of a person, whom under other UN anti-terrorism conventions,
is alleged to have committed an offense (IMO, 2019).

2.2.3 The International Convention on Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS):
To make travel and trade through sea as safe and secure as possible is part of the
International Maritime Organization’s mandate. To achieve this, the organization
develops guidance and regulations through the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC),
with inputs from its Facilitation (FAL) and Legal (LEG) committees, in order to
mitigate or manage threats with the potential of compromising maritime safety.
Appropriate guidance aimed at addressing maritime security has been adopted by the
IMO. The IMO also supports Best Management Practices (BMP) which is developed
by the shipping industry, having list appropriate procedures to be employed in
response to acts or attempted acts of piracy or armed robbery against ships, as well as
other maritime security initiatives and bridges (IMO, 2019).
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New maritime security regulatory regime was adopted under the International
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974 as amended, on the 1 st July,
2004, named, “special measures to enhance maritime security” (Chapter XI-2), which
comprises the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code (IMO, 2019).
Also, several frameworks have been introduced on either voluntary or compulsory
basis, with a view to enhancing maritime security since the 9/11 2001 terrorist attack
in the United States of America (Bichonu and Evans, 2013). In addition, the IMO,
through its MSC and FAL Committees, as well as sub-division for Maritime Security
and Facilitation (MSF), work in close cooperation on matters affecting other aspects
of maritime security bridges, for example; stowaways, drug smuggling, and other
transnational organized crimes (IMO, 2019).

2.3 IMO/African Frameworks and Collaborations on Maritime Security:
Appropriate guidance aimed at addressing maritime security challenges have been
adopted by the IMO. This includes guidance to governments, shipowners and ship
managers, ship masters and crews, on how to prevent and suppress acts of armed
robbery and piracy against ships, among others (IMO, 2019). According to Brits and
Nel, 2018, the African concept of security has been characterized by land-based
conflicts, hence, little attention was paid to maritime threats and maritime
environmental protection. The strategies and initiatives of the IMO to enhance
maritime security in West Africa particularly, aligns with the Yaoundé Code of
Conduct (IMO, 2019).

The African Union (AU) was compelled to develop a joint strategy aimed at addressing
its changing African Maritime Domain (AMD), due to the rapid escalation of piracy,
hence, the adoption of Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy (AIMS 2050) in 2014,
which culminated to a binding charter on maritime security and safety in Lomé, 2016,
popularly called the Lomé Charter (Brits and Nel, 2018). Also, the Economic
Community of West African States’ (ECOWAS) Integrated Maritime Strategy (IMS),
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is aimed at stopping and reversing negative trends in the maritime domain, and set out
uniform standards to structure and regulate related activities (ECOWAS, 2014).

The Yaoundé Code of Conduct, developed by the West and Central Africa Sub-region
is for the purposes of managing and reducing considerably the adverse impacts of illicit
maritime activities such as piracy, armed robbery against ships, as well as illegal,
unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, among others (IMO, 2019). According to
ECOWAS, 2016, in the Yaoundé Code of Conduct, “Piracy consists of any of the
following acts:

(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation,
committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship
or a private aircraft, and directed:

(i)

on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons
or property on board such ship or aircraft;

(ii)

against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the
jurisdiction of any state;

(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft
with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in
subparagraph (a) or (b).
“Armed robbery at sea” consists of any of the following acts:
(a) unlawful act of violence of detention or any act of depredation, or threat
thereof, other than an act of piracy, committed for private ends and directed
against a ship or against persons or property on board such a ship, within a
State’s internal waters, archipelagic waters or territorial sea:
(b) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in
subparagraph (a).
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“Transnational organized crime in the maritime domain” includes but is not
limited to any of the following acts when committed at sea;
(a) money laundering,
(b) illegal arms and drug trafficking,
(c) piracy and armed robbery at sea,
(d) illegal oil bunkering,
(e) crude oil theft
(f) human trafficking,
(g) human smuggling,
(h) maritime pollution,
(i) IUU fishing,
(j) Illegal dumping of toxic waste,
(k) Maritime terrorism and hostage taking,
(l) Vandalization of offshore oil infrastructure”.

The Yaoundé Code of Conduct alludes to the point of Feldt et al., 2013, which points
to the fact that there is limited success in sectoral approach to maritime security, hence,
the need for a comprehensive approach; national, regional and international
collaborations are of importance. Also, Otto and Jernberg, 2019; Walker, 2020, stated
that regional initiatives or cooperation between States yields the most effective
responses to piracy and other maritime security challenges, partly due to the fact that
some types of piracy undertaken and causes, are largely driven by the littoral States’
geography and by the economic and political developments on land. The ability of
States and Agencies to cope and respond are constrained by the transnational nature
of threats and crimes at sea. A number of conventions and multilateral treaties play an
important role in addressing these maritime security challenges, through encouraging
cooperation and the enforcement of rules and common norms (Walker, 2020).
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Figure 4. The Yaoundé Architecture/Information sharing. Source: (CIMSEC, 2015).

2.4 The IMO/Gulf of Guinea (GoG) Collaborations on Maritime Security:
The IMO assists Member countries in the GoG through developing and coordinating
relevant procedures and structures, revising national legislations to criminalize piracy,
armed robbery against ships and other unlawful maritime activities, and also ensuring
that technical, operational and logistical personnel are trained adequately. Member
States who seek to develop their own regional or national measures to address piracy,
armed robbery against ships and other illegal maritime activities are provided with
assistance by the IMO if requested. An example of regional instruments are the
Djibouti Code of Conduct, concerning the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery
Against Ships in the Gulf of Aden and the Western Indian Ocean, and also, the “Code
of Conduct concerning the repression of piracy, armed robbery against ship, and illicit
maritime activities in the West and Central Africa GoG region” (IMO, 2019). Internal
security and territorial defence are core, but not the whole security responsibility of
any nation’s armed forces. Most times, insurgency and communal violence are closely
tied to piracy, drug trafficking, transnational terrorism and other criminal activities,
hence, no nation can deal with these transnational challenges alone (Valencia, 2004).
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2.5 Gulf of Guinea (GoG) Maritime Security and Nigeria’s DBP Efforts:
Inasmuch as countries in the GoG region are faced with the dire maritime insecurity
consequences, so far, they have not been able to develop a cogent and coherent
maritime security strategy, policy or framework, to effectively tackle the menace
(Ukeje and Ela, 2013). According to Charo, 2021, the absence of a national maritime
security strategy, as well as a strategic national security policy puts national interest at
stake and under threats, which engenders reactive responses among security agencies
of the nation. Also, according to the African Centre for Strategic Studies, 2019, as
cited by Charo, 2021, States are prompted to innovate numerous maritime security
architectures due to the increase in maritime consciousness, in order to enhance their
maritime security, which is often invincible defence to the contemporary way of life.
The above submissions could be ascribed to part of the efforts being made in the Deep
Blue project by the Nigerian government, in that, the DBP structure, unlike what
existed before, aims to harmonize operational mandates between both civil and
military agencies charged with the security of Nigeria’s maritime domain, as well as
providing a national strategy, backed by law, in tackling maritime insecurity within
Nigerian waters and the GoG by extension.

2.6 Nigerian Legislation and Legal Frameworks on Maritime Security:


Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) Act, 2007:

Among the functions and duties of the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety
Agency (NIMASA) is the provision of maritime security, as obtained in the NIMASA
Act, 2007, Part IV (P), and also, to establish implementation procedure for conventions
of the IMO and the International Labour Organization (ILO), as well as other
international conventions to which the Federal Republic of Nigeria is a party,
especially, on maritime safety and security (NIMASA, 2019).


Nigerian Merchant Shipping (MSA) Act., 2007:
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The Nigerian Merchant Shipping Act. 2007 also addresses maritime security in Part
XXVII (Assistance to Salvage of Vessels), 396, “Duty to provide security”.


Suppression of Piracy and Other Maritime Offenses (SPOMO) Act., 2019:

The Suppression of Piracy and Other Maritime Offences (SPOMO) Act. 2019, offers
more overarching national legal framework on provision of security and suppression
of piracy and other unlawful acts in Nigeria’s maritime domain. The SPOMO Act.
works in tandem with the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS), 1982, and the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful acts
against the Safety of Navigation (SUA), 1988, and its amendments. The objective of
the SPOMO Act. is to, “prevent and suppress piracy, armed robbery and any other
unlawful act against a ship, aircraft and any other maritime craft, however propelled,
including fixed or floating platform”. (SPOMO Act, 2019).

2.7 Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed
Robbery Against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) and The Malacca Straits.
The 1997 Asian financial crisis resulted in the surge in maritime piracy and armed
robbery in Southeast Asia, leading to the drafting of ReCAAP by 16 countries in 2004.
Since inception, ReCAAP has managed to decrease the number of attacks in the region
significantly, and has become one of the bases for counter-piracy efforts in Southeast
Asia (Hribernik, 2013). ReCAAP is an important regional agreement for combating
incidents of piracy and robbery against ships (Win et al., 2016), and the first regional
government-to-government agreement towards promoting and enhancing cooperation
against piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia (ReCAAP, 2021).
Unfortunately, Indonesia and Malaysia are the only littoral states that chose not to
ratify the ReCAAP, though affected by incidents of piracy, and were involved in the
drafting process (Hribernik, 2013; Ismail, 2021; Menzel, 2022).
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Figure 5. Incidents onboard ships at berth/anchor. Source: (ReCAAP ISC Annual Report, 2015).

Figure 6. Incidents onboard ships while underway. Source: (ReCAAP ISC Annual Report, 2015).

In the ReCAAP agreement, the roles and activities include; Information Sharing
Centre (ISC), in order to promote close cooperation among member countries in
preventing and suppressing piracy and armed robbery against ships, increasing the
capacity of member countries to prevent and suppress piracy and armed robbery
against ships, as well as promoting cooperation with other regional and international
organizations in information sharing and best practices to enhance their ability to
handle incidents of piracy and armed robbery collectively (ReCAAP, n.d.-b; Win et
al., 2016). Perhaps one of its shortcomings, ReCAAP is incapable of having a big
impact in terms of joint maritime enforcement operations due to the fact that its
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provisions are mostly limited to sharing of information. Also, it does not supersede the
UNCLOS enforcement measure as a regional initiative because, for example, pirate
ships in other states’ territorial waters cannot be seized by any member state (Amri,
2014).

The operational gap in the ReCAAP necessitated other regional efforts to suppress
piracy and other maritime security challenges, particularly, in the Strait of Malacca
(Amri, 2014). Jointly the regional states within the Malacca Strait, Malaysia, Indonesia
and Singapore, developed a unique mechanism for ensuring security and safety in the
Strait (Upadhyaya, 2010).

2.8 Gulf of Aden Maritime Security:
The Gulf of Aden is an extension of the Indian Ocean, situated between the African
continent and the Arabian Peninsula. It connects the Red Sea to the Arabian Seas
through the Strait of Bab El Mandeb, and also, a critical part of the Suez Canal shipping
route, which connects the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea (WorldAtlas, 2022).
Somalia and Somaliland lie along its coastline to the South, Yemen to the North and
Djibouti to the East (MarineInsight, 2021).

According to Lu et al., 2010, in 2008, the issue of maritime security was brought to
the forefront of international debate due to the rise in piracy activities in the Gulf of
Aden. The coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden off the Horn of Africa has become
of growing concern to states and stakeholders in the shipping industry due to the recent
increase in the range and frequency of pirate attacks within the region (Onuoha, 2010).
Maritime security is paramount to Somalia, as it has a real impact on regional security,
economic development and the entire region stability, hence, the European Union
Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP), works with the Somali partners to strengthen
the roles and functions of the Coast Guard and other actors, including provision of
trainings and equipment (Neijnes, 2021).
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Figure 7. Gulf of Aden. Source: (WorldAtlas, 2022).
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Chapter 3.
Methodology.
3.1 Introduction:
In order to answer the research questions and attain the set objectives of the research,
several methods such as integrative literature reviews were adopted to analyse data
collected from different literatures, as well as analysis of data from interviews
conducted. The uniqueness of this research topic makes it necessary to incorporate and
infer data from various literatures, as well as carry out interviews to activate new
thinking about the topic and trigger more research. The researcher takes account of the
sensitive and restrictive nature of data, as it has to do with the national security of the
selected countries and jurisdictions, hence, part of the limitations of the research.

3.2 Data Collection:
The research data were primarily sourced through interviews with the Nigeria’s DBP
Manager, and Head of Mission, European Union Capacity Building Mission
(EUCAP), through the good offices of its leader Mr. Christopher Reynolds,
Mogadishu, Somalia, in the Gulf of Aden. Secondary data were sourced via literature
reviews such as; scholarly articles, seminars/workshops, reports, credible
governmental and intergovernmental databases such as; IMO, ICC IMB, SNMS,
NIMASA, and other internet sources.
Data/Information
Gathering

Interviews: DBP
Manager, HoM
EUCAP Gulf of Aden.

DBP Operations:
Including relevant
documents of the
DBP C4i
Operations from
inception till date.

Maritime
Security in the
Gulf of Aden
(Somalia),
Including
relevant
documents.

Databases from
Publications/Articles
/Journals

International
Organizations
Documents such as
IMO Conventions,
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reports,
resolutions,
guidelines.

Some selected
countries' documents
on maritime security.
For example; Malacca
Strait, USA, Singapore.

3.3 International Standards for An Ideal Maritime Security Framework:
The International Maritime Organization (IMO), through its Maritime Safety
Committee, MSC.1/Circ. 1333/Rev.1, 2015, gave recommendations to governments,
especially, as it concerns prevention and suppression of piracy and armed robbery
against ships, and other forms of maritime security challenges. The recommendations,
among others, include;

3.3.1 Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships:
1. “It is imperative for governmental or other agencies concerned to gather
accurate incident statistics involving piracy and armed robbery against
ships before embarking on any set of recommendations or measures. The
statistics to collate should include; type, area and nature of the attacks, with
special emphasis on types of attack, precise geographical location and
modus operandi of the offenders and to disseminate these statistics to all
stakeholders in a format that is understandable and usable. Information
which could enable governments to act in a coordinated manner even
before an attack occurs can be obtained using advanced intelligence”.
2. “Governments should issue to ships entitled to fly their flag necessary
advice and guidance on any appropriate additional precautionary measure
ships may need to protect themselves from attack, based on the statistics of
incidents or intelligence reports on piracy and armed robbery against
ships”.
3. “Representatives of shipowners and seafarers should be involved by the
governments in the development of measures to prevent and suppress
piracy and armed robbery against ships” (IMO, 2019).
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3.3.2 Action Plans:
1. Development of action plans specifying how to prevent attack in the first
place, and actions to take when an attack occurs.
2. Need to counter any ensuing oil spills or leakages of dangerous substances
that the ship may be carrying, in case there is a collision or grounding of a
ship, as a result of an attack.
3. Need to take appropriate measures for the purpose of maximizing
effectiveness and efficiency, as well as minimizing any relevant adversity,
by all national agencies involved in preventing and suppressing piracy and
armed robbery against ships.
4. Establishment of a Point of Contact (PoC), through which the ships entitled
to fly a country’s flag may request assistance of advice when sailing in
waters believed to present a heightened threat.
5. As set out in Article 100 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), States are required to cooperate to the fullest
possible extent in the repression of piracy. To this end, states are requested
to take an active part in the fight against piracy, if they are interested in the
security of maritime activities. This could be done by contributing to
capacity building efforts, deploying naval vessels and aircraft in
accordance with international law to patrol the affected areas, as well as by
prosecuting suspected pirates (IMO, 2019).

3.3.3 Cooperation and Communication Between Various Agencies and Response
Time after an Incident Has Been Reported to the Coastal State:
According to the MSC. 1/Circ. 1333/ Rev. 1, Annex, (page 4), the following
should be adopted by the coastal State;
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1. An incident command system for operational, as well as tactical response
in each country concerned, in order to provide a common terminology; a
unified command structure; integrated communications; a manageable
span of control; designated incident facilities; consolidated action plans
and comprehensive resource management.
2. Mechanisms for dealing with other maritime security issues, e.g., drugtrafficking, smuggling and terrorism. In order to efficiently use the limited
resources, they should be incorporated into the incident command system.
3. Develop, or if existing, keep reviewing procedures for rapidly relaying
alerts received through communication centres to the responsible entities
for prompt actions.
4. When appropriate, governments should by bilateral or multilateral
agreements cooperate in establishing a Single Point of Contact (SPC) for
ships to report threats of piracy of specific high threat area activities (IMO,
2019).

3.3.4 Criminal Jurisdiction:
1. For committing acts of piracy or armed robbery against ships, a person
apprehended at sea, outside the territorial sea of any state, should be
prosecuted under the laws of the investigating State, and by mutual
agreement with other substantially interested states according to MSC.
1/Circ. 1333/ Rev. 1, Annex, (page 6).
2. To enable States, apprehend and prosecute persons committing such
offences, it is recommended that States should take such measures as may
be necessary to establish their jurisdiction over the offences of piracy and
armed robbery at sea, including their legislation adjustment if necessary
(IMO, 2019).
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3.4 Maritime Security Apparatus of the United States of America (USA):
The maritime security apparatus of the United States is a multi-agency effort, which
incorporates major actors from multiple departments of the government. Departments
of Defense, Commerce, Homeland Security, Energy, State and Transportation, all have
major responsibilities and key roles in executing maritime security national strategy
(Herzinger, 2021). This strategy, along with its related plans, represent a multi-layered
approach, and includes improved maritime domain awareness, as well as enhanced
prevention, protection and recovery capabilities (USHS, 2013). The main document
guiding American maritime security policy is the 2005 National Strategy for Maritime
Security, along with its supporting plans; the Maritime Operational Threat Response
Plan, the National Maritime Domain Awareness Plan, the International Outreach and
Coordination Strategy, the Maritime Transportation System Security Plan, the
Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan, and the Maritime Commerce Security Plan.
Each document offers departmental responsibilities and plans, classifies focus areas,
and shows how each line of effort supports the overarching strategy, as well as the
effective measures to employ (Herzinger, 2021).
The United States maritime security strategic objectives include;

1. Establishment of consistent and unified US positions on maritime security
initiatives and programs for bilateral and multilateral exchanges.
2. Full incorporation of international law in the advancement of worldwide
maritime security.
3. Emphasis on maritime security as a key priority in the US international policy.

3.5 The Gulf of Aden, (Somalia) Maritime Security Strategy:
The interview conducted on maritime security strategies in the Gulf of Aden, through
the European Union Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP), revealed that maritime
security, maritime response and recovery, as well as maritime safety are part of the
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pillars in National Maritime Strategy of Somalia, which is aimed at addressing
peaceful and stable maritime domain as a matter of national security. One of Somalia’s
Maritime Security Strategic Goals is to enhance capacities in order to ensure that
agencies and naval assets with defence roles are able to protect the maritime domain
from threats or losses as a result of illegal acts of aggression, which can impact on
security, economy, as well as the environment. Another strategic goal is to strengthen
and ensure effective exercise of defensive authorities and responsibilities to detect,
deter and interdict unlawful acts against assets, infrastructure and the country’s
maritime domain interests, including the interest of stakeholders and users.
The objective is to delineate roles and responsibilities within and amongst national
maritime agencies with respect to enforcement jurisdictions, and also, facilitate interagency cooperation and coordination in support of national strategy. The Somali
National Maritime Strategy, 2022, has the following stated goals;

1. Maritime defence forces which comprise a military command and control
structure of naval and supporting forces, including inter-service liaison,
regional and international cooperation mechanisms.
2. Maritime defence administration which comprises personnel, procurement,
infrastructure, professional education and established system of promotion, as
well as capacity to administer a maritime, civil, military and criminal justice
system.
3. Establishment of shared capability for Maritime Domain Awareness/Maritime
Situational Awareness (MDA/MSA).
4. Maritime Security Focal Point establishment at the Federal and State levels
5. Establishment of a National Maritime Operational Coordination Capability
which can integrate coastal communities at the Federal, State levels, as well as
the regional and international centres.

3.6 The Strait of Malacca Maritime Security Infrastructure:
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Having three littoral states of Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, the Strait of Malacca
is one of the most important international Straits in the world. Its importance in
international shipping activities can be viewed from the existence of oil flows, which
ships transport through the Strait, which is larger than the Suez Canal, and also, greater
than those being transported through the Panama Canal. In an effort to eliminate
transnational crime that occurs in the Malacca Strait, cooperation between maritime
stakeholders is one of the options taken to overcome the limitation of facilities and
infrastructure (Lee & McGahan, 2015; Kusuma et al., 2021). The firm action taken by
Malaysia and the littoral states ensured dramatic reduction in attacks in the Malacca
Strait. The multi-jurisdictional measures, such as “eye-in-the-sky”, and coordinated
patrols, have resulted in piracy drop in the region (Baharum, 2007; Hassan, 2007).

Figure 8. Strait of Malacca. Source: (IILSS, 2021).

The Operation MALSINDO (Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore), was the first
commitment of the three littoral states towards coordinated patrols in a multilateral,
rather than bilateral setting between each other. States allocates a number of vessels
for coordinated patrols in the Strait of Malacca, with the aim of combating piracy and
other transnational organized crimes which occur within the Strait. It is also known as
the Malacca Straits Security Initiative (MSSI), or Malacca Straits Sea Patrol (MSSP)
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(Ho, 2004; Massey, 2008). There were 17 ships assigned to operation MALSINDO
when it took off in 2004, both Malaysia and Singapore contributed 5 ships each, while
Indonesia contributed 7 ships. The ships only patrol the territorial waters of the state
they are from, due to the need to respect the sovereignty of each state (Massey, 2008).
Cross-border pursuits through other states’ territorial seas is not allowed under MSSP,
as it is seen as an interference with other states’ sovereignty, hence, one of the
weaknesses (Amri, 2014).

Aerial patrols over the Strait of Malacca, under the Eyes-In-The-Sky (EiS) plan, was
also launched by the countries in the region to supplement the MALSINDO effort
(Amri, 2014). According to Cheney-Peters, 2015, the Eyes-in-the-Sky component of
the Malacca Strait Patrol (MSP) is geared towards enhanced Maritime Domain
Awareness (MDA) and enforcement. The Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) patrols
twice a week as a contribution by those participating in the EiS initiative, and these
aircrafts are allowed to fly no closer than 3NM from the land of EiS states. Two patrols
a week along designated areas in the Strait of Malacca and Singapore are conducted
by the MPAs, and a military officer from each state is onboard during any mission and
is responsible for alerting their respective monitoring agencies when suspicious
contacts are made (Pullen & Truver, 2006; Massey, 2008).

3.7 Identified Components of An Ideal Maritime Security Infrastructure:
Based on the above listed IMO-MSC recommendations and guidance to governments
on maritime security architecture, especially, as it affects piracy and other
transnational organized crimes, and also, based on the identified best practices from
the US, Gulf of Aden and the Strait of Malacca as captured above, the identified
components of an ideal structure for maritime security are, (but not limited to);
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COMPONENTS
OF IDEAL
MARITIME
SECURITY
FRAMEWORK

Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA)
Legal Framework
Adequate Human Resources
Alerting System
Advanced Intelligence System
Air and Sea Assets
Unified Command Structure
Integrated Communication/Common Terminology
Governance System, Multi-Agency/Multi-Layer Approach, and Cooperation between stakeholders
Point of Contact (PoC) Establishment and Action Plan Development
Accurate Incident Statistics
Contingency Plan for Oil Spill or Leakages due to attacks
Mechanism for other Maritime Security challenges, e.g., drug-trafficking, smuggling among others.

Table 1. Components of an ideal maritime security framework. Source: (Created by the
Author).

3.8 Alignment of Nigeria’s Deep Blue Project with the Maritime Security
Features of the above Mentioned Comparative Studies:
3.8.1 Maritime Domain Awareness Capabilities:
According to NIMASA, 2021, the primary aim of the DBP C4i Centre is to provide
Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), intelligence and reconnaissance, to aid
informed enforcement operations, particularly, on maritime security and safety
interventions. All the information needed by other components of the DB project, for
example, situational awareness and intelligence, emanate from the C4i Centre. The
components of the C4i Centre include; the C4i System Stations, Maritime Intelligence
System, Aerial Mission Management System with Multi-Sensor Integrated System
(MSIS), Communication Systems and Satellite Communication System. The reports
generated from the Centre, among others, include; sea piracy and armed robbery
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incidents, maritime domain trend analysis, maritime intelligence summary, maritime
security threat assessments, vessel investigation records, record of events.

Figure 9. Deep Blue project C4i Centre. Source: (Captured by Author).

The C4i systems for maritime domain awareness have the following capabilities;


Coastal and Satellite Automatic Identification System (AIS) signals worldwide



Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) – for Non-AIS complying vessels



Arena statistics and case reports



Trend analysis and alerting



Multi Sensor Integration System (MSIS) – for Aerial Mission Management



Coastal Radar detecting;
-

Small craft

-

Bunkering activity

-

Criminal activities close to shore



GoGIN MMCC Zone E integration for security and SAR



External system integration into Lloyd’s list and the NAVY Falcon Eye.
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The feedbacks to the C4i Centre from these aforementioned systems include;


Vessels operating within and close to Nigerian waters



Vessels with incidences



Vessels operating with dark activities



Profile of voyage path of vessels for the past eight years

Figure 10. Activities within Nigeria’s EEZ from C4i MDA systems. Source: (NIMASA C4i, 2021).

In addition to the above mentioned DBP C4i capabilities and system generated
information regarding domain awareness, the C4i Centre is also in collaboration with
some national and international organizations, geared towards maritime domain
awareness and security. They include;


Nigerian Navy Falcon Eye Centre



Nigerian Navy RMAC Centre



GoG Maritime collaboration Forum (GoG-MCF/SHADE)



Yaoundé Architecture Regional Information System (YARIS)



Maritime Domain Awareness for Trade Gulf of Guinea (MDAT-GoG)



International Maritime Bureau (IMB).
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3.8.2 Legal Framework Backing the Deep Blue Project Activities:
The Deep Blue project uses both national and international laws on maritime security
to carry out its activities. The legal frameworks include;

1. The Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) Act.
2007, which stipulates, “provision of maritime security”, in Part IV (P).
2. The Nigerian Merchant Shipping (MSA) Act. 2007, which also hinted at
maritime security in Part XXVII (Assistance to Salvage of Vessels), 396,
“Duty to provide security”.
3. More specifically, the Deep Blue project leverages on the provisions of the
Suppression of Piracy and Other Maritime Offences (SPOMO) Act. 2019,
which is a more overarching national legal framework on the provision of
maritime security, as well as suppression of piracy and other unlawful activities
in Nigeria’s maritime domain.
4. International conventions, such as ISPS, SUA, including other conventions to
which the Federal Republic of Nigeria is a party, especially, on maritime
security and safety (NIMASA, 2021).

3.8.3 Personnel Engaged in the Deep Blue Project and Trainings:
The personnel deployed to the DB project are in two categories; C4i Centre personnel
and response/intervention personnel at sea. The C4i personnel is composed of both
civilian and military officers specifically trained for the DBP operations. The
personnel are drawn from NIMASA, Nigerian NAVY, ARMY, AIRFORCE,
Department of State Service (DSS) and the Nigerian Police Force (NPF). The
response/intervention team are about 350 personnel, and are composed majorly of
military personnel with specific training on the DB project integrative modus operandi

41

on response and general maritime security within Nigeria’s EEZ and the GoG by
extension.

C4i Personnel Distribution
30

27
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NIMASA

AIRFORCE

NAVY

POLICE

Table 2. Summary of Staff strength of the C4i Centre. Source: (NIMASA C4i, Created by Author).

The personnel engaged in the DB project have equally undergone certain security
trainings as summarized in the table below;

Table 3. Command, Control, Computer, Communication and Intelligence (C4i) Training. Source:
(NIMASA C4i Centre).
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Table 4. Maritime Security Training. Source: (NIMASA C4i Centre).

Table 5. Special Mission Aircraft Training. Source: (NIMASA C4i Centre).

Table 6. Other Local Trainings on Aircraft Operations. Source: (NIMASA C4i Centre).

3.8.4 Deep Blue Project C4i Alerting Systems and Reporting Lines:
According to Gonzalez, 2020, an alerting system is a platform which centralizes alerts
from various systems and tools, and distributes those alerts to professionals who can
act on the incident or inform the wider business ecosystem. These platforms help to
ensure quick responses to events, as well as reduce the possibility of ignoring or
overlooking alerts. The DBP C4i has a chain of alerting systems and reporting lines,
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depending on the nature of the incident being handled. The summary is below
captured;

Figure 11. DBP C4i Alerting Systems/Reporting Lines. Source: (NIMASA C4i Centre, 2022).

3.8.5 Advanced Intelligence System of the Deep Blue Project:
The C4i of the DBP has a dedicated Maritime Intelligence System (MIS) work station
for its operations. The system tracks, investigates and reports both present and past
activities of vessels calling into Nigerian waters from any part of the world, including
vessel owners or operators. Vessels with irregular movements, dark activities or
vessels that can pose threat to Nigeria’s maritime domain are identified for further
investigations and necessary actions. The Intelligence System aids investigation and
analysis of vessels and trends, and has the capability of presenting all AIS transmitting
vessels with their unique information. Its overall capabilities, according to NIMASA
C4i, 2022, include;


Coastal AIS + SAT AIS signals all over the world



Database consisting of several providers



Ability to monitor vessel’s movement up to 8 years backwards



Area analysis capability



Trend analysis capabilities



Alert setting capabilities
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Case report and arena statistics reports



Risk calculation of vessels and company risk analysis capabilities.

Figure 12. Past activities of a vessel tracked by the C4i MIS. Source: (NIMASA C4i).

3.8.6 The Deep Blue Project Air, Sea and Land Assets:
The DB project has the following air, sea and land assets;


Special Mission Vessels (DB Lagos & DB Abuja) – 2



Special Mission Aircraft – 2



Special Mission Helicopters – 3



Fast Intervention Vessels – 17



Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) – 4



Armoured Vehicles – 16

1. The

Special

Mission

Vessels

(SMVs)

are

composed

of;

hybrid

propulsion/green technology, 2 fast interceptor boats, a helipad, and has speed
of 21knots, low fuel consumption, with a length of 55.20m, and classed by
Germanischer Lloyds (GL).
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2. The Fast Interceptor Vessels (FIVs) are composed of communication
equipment, projectors, maritime Radar, three outboard engines of 300hp each,
night vision capability and a speed of 55knots.
3. The Special Mission Aircraft (SMA) – New Williams FJ44-34 turbofan
engine, advanced multi-mode Radar, line of sight data link, AIS enabled, multisensor integration system (MSIS), Satellite communication system, with 10
crew maximum capacity.
4. The Special Mission Helicopter (SMH) – Augusta AW 139, has a max cruise
speed of 156ktas, fast drop system, communication equipment, AIS enabled,
with carriage capacity of 2 Pilots, 6 crew.
5. The Unmanned Air Vehicle (UAV) has 2 longwave infrared thermal imaging
cameras, AIS enabled, day and night vision, heat signature classification and
endurance capacity of up to 8-12 hours.
6. The Armoured Vehicles (Musketeers) are Toyota 6.7L V8 OHV Rover Stroke
Turbo-Diesel, 300hp @2,800rpm: power to weight: 37.5hp/ton, 130-liter
capacity, with estimated 500km travel distance.

Figure 13. Some assets of the DB project. Source: (Captured by the Author).

46

3.8.7 The Deep Blue Project Command Structure:
A military officer, within the rank of a Brigadier General, is appointed by appropriate
military authorities within the Deep Blue project to exercise command and control of
all military grade assets involved in the project, as well as oversee the project’s
operational activities, either in full or acting capacity. The Director General of
NIMASA, also appoints a top-ranking officer of the Agency to manage and control
the DB project’s routine administrative affairs, including personnel welfare and
equipment maintenance. A formal organogram of the DBP is still ongoing.

3.8.8 Deep Blue Project’s Integrated Communication/Common Terminology:
The mode of communication within the DB project’s shore and sea operations is based
on the Command, Control, Computer, Communication, Intelligence (C4i) training,
which included; C4i Operator Course, Intelligence System Course and Shift Operator
Course for the personnel engaged in the C4i Centre, while that of the military
intervention team included; Basic Infantry and Intervention Courses, Special
Intervention training among others. Suffice it to say, the communication/common
terminology used by personnel is as offered by the aforementioned training. According
to NIMASA C4i, 2022, “during operations, the Centre establishes communication
with the sea assets through encrypted radio communication channels via tactical
radios; VHF, MF and HF. As a backup to the radio communication system, there is
provision for satellite communication devices on both platforms”. Also available in
the C4i Centre is a data link function, where information on targets can be sent to the
intervention teams during operations.
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3.8.9 Deep Blue Project’s Governance System, Multi-Agency, Multi-Layer Approach,
and Cooperation Between Stakeholders:
The Nigeria’s DB project governance system is composed of a steering committee
having the following as members;


The Honourable Minister of Transport



Honourable Minister of Defense



National Security Adviser



Chief of Defense Staff



Chief of Naval Staff



Chief of Army Staff



Inspector General of Police



Director General of NIMASA

The multi-agency approach of Nigeria’s DBP involves the following agencies of
government, who serve as the Project Management Committee (PMC);


Federal Ministry of Transportation (FMOT)



Ministry of Defense (MOD)



Nigerian ARMY, NAVY and AIRFORCE



Department of State Security Service (DSSS)



Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA)



Nigerian Police Force (NPF)



Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA).

The multi-layer approach to maritime security in the Deep Blue project involves air,
land and sea approaches;
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The first approach is the deployment of Special Mission Vessels at sea,
including fast interceptor boats within Nigerian waters. These vessels
periodically patrol the Nigerian maritime domain and intercepts any illegal
activity. The C4i Centre communicates the vessels on any identified suspicious
activity also for prompt actions.



The airborne assets, Special Mission Aircraft and Helicopters, periodically
patrol the Nigerian waters and send signals of suspicious activities to the C4i
Centre through the Mission Systems Equipment (MSE). The MSE Operator
analyses and verifies the signals from the aircrafts, which are real-time pictures
and videos footage through a Multi-Sensor Integration System (MSIS), and
shares suspicious target’s information with other intervention units of the
projects for further necessary actions.



Another approach is the deployment of armoured vehicles to monitor activities
of criminals on land close to the creeks.

The existing Deep Blue project’s stakeholders’ cooperation is through a Joint Working
Group (JWG), comprising the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency
(NIMASA), the Ministry of Transportation, the Nigerian Ports Authority, Nigerian
Navy, Marine Police Interpol, the oil industry under the aegis of Oil Companies
International Marine Forum (OCIMF) and the shipping industry represented by ICS,
BIMCO, INTERTANKO, INTERCARGO and the Nigerian Shipowners’ Association.
The aim of the JWG is to facilitate coordination between the government and the
industry, and combine efforts in order to deter and respond to incidents of piracy and
armed robbery in Nigeria’s EEZ and territorial waters, as well as address other issues
on maritime security (NIMASA, 2020).

3.8.10 Deep Blue Project’s Point of Contact (PoC), Action Plan Development and
Incident Statistics:
The C4i Centre serves as the PoC for the Deep Blue project. The DBP’s action plan is
specified in the Standard Operating Procedure (SOP), which among others include;
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fast response/intervention, better decision-making process, information delivery
precision and accuracy. Incident statistics records, in the form of Operational Log, are
kept in the C4i Centre of the Deep Blue project on a 24/7hour basis. Also, records of
vessels with irregular activities are also kept in the electronic log for future reference
and investigation purposes.

Table 7. Vessels of interest within Nigeria’s maritime domain. Source: (NIMASA C4i, 2021).

3.9 Alignment of the GoG Framework to the Identified Ideal Regional
Cooperation on Maritime Security:


Multi-jurisdictional Approach



Bilateral/Multilateral Single Point of Contact (SPC)



Asset Contribution

3.9.1 Gulf of Guinea Multi-Jurisdictional, Bilateral/Multilateral SPC Approaches to
Maritime Security:
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The strategy adopted in June, 2013, at Yaoundé Cameroun, by the heads of
government of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS),
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), including the Gulf of
Guinea Commission (GGC), on multi-jurisdictional, bilateral/multilateral Single Point
of Contact approaches, towards prevention and prosecution of illicit activities in the
GoG’s maritime domain are as illustrated by the picture in Fig. 15. The Yaoundé
Architecture comprises the Interregional Coordination Centre (ICC), the informationsharing interface between the Regional Maritime Security Centre for Central Africa
(CRESMAC), and the Regional Maritime Security Centre for West Africa
(CRESMAO). The Gulf of Guinea coastal space is divided into five (5) operational
maritime zones, and the coordination of activities are done by five Maritime
Multinational Coordination Centre (MMCC) (GoGIN, 2022). A Code of Conduct on
the repression of piracy, armed robbery against ships, as well as other illicit maritime
activities in the West and Central Africa was adopted in order to promote collective
efforts on information sharing, interdiction, prosecution and support to victims of
attack (Osinowo, 2015).

Figure 12. Yaoundé Architecture for maritime security and safety. Source: (GoGIN, 2022).
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3.9.2 Gulf of Guinea Maritime Security Asset Contribution:
There appears to be little if any joint asset contribution arrangement exists so far
between states within the Gulf of Guinea towards the security of the region’s maritime
domain, from the available literature. The Yaoundé agreement, according to Hassan
and Hasan, 2017, only features; establishment of information sharing network, nonbinding legal instrument, scope of enforcement powers, prosecution of pirates,
maritime security cooperation, seizure of pirate ship, including adoption of certain
national strategies. Governments in the region have been slow to understand how their
absence in the maritime domain costs them untold revenue, as well as undermines the
security on land, as criminal activities start at sea and ends onshore; Hence, the need
to fashion and implement an all-inclusive security policy by stakeholders, having the
requisite assets, especially, by the countries signatory to the Yaoundé Code of
Conduct, including ECOWAS, ECCAS, and GGC (Osinowo, 2015; Ifesinachi &
Nwangwu, 2015). However, prior to the Yaoundé Code of Conduct of 2013, several
initiatives had been taken by the GoG states towards fighting piracy and other
associated trans-national maritime criminality within the region (Ifesinachi &
Nwangwu, 2015).
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Chapter 4.
4.0 Discussions and Analysis.
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Figure. 15. Components of ideal maritime security framework national/regional. Source:
(Created by Author based upon best international practice).
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4.1 Deep Blue Project’s Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats
(SWOT)/Areas for Improvement in Comparison with An Ideal Maritime
Security Framework:

4.1.2 Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA):
According to Bueger, 2015, the goal of maritime domain awareness is to develop a
shared understanding of threats and developments at sea. Each MDA Centre has its
own strength, hence, works complementarity to the overarching system, which is
basically enabling trust, being flexible and adapting to changing situations at sea. Also,
Buegar and Edmunds, 2017, stated, “the aim of MDA is to provide a rich information
database, often in real time, against which maritime security activities, including
interceptions and inspections of vessels can be planned and targeted, through a datamining technique which is centralized. A comprehensive maritime domain awareness
should include; detection, tracking and identification of vessels (Bannister & Neyland,
2015). The Deep Blue project appears to have a considerable MDA capability, owing
to the multi-sensor system integration, as well as other capabilities within the C4i
System towards situational awareness at sea, which are able to generate; vessels with
dark activities, past voyages and routes of vessels, among other feedbacks to the C4i
Systems for analysis. This is similar to the Bakanila Integrated Information System
(BIIS), used by Indonesia in the Malacca Strait, which is able to provide early warning
notification and information by analysing suspicious events or objects based on certain
behaviour or anomalies (Kusume et al., 2021). Also, the alliance of the DBP’s C4i
Centre with other MDA platforms, e.g., NAVY, IMB, GOG-MCF/SHADE, YARIS,
MDAT-GOG, alludes to the point of Bueger, 2015, on complementary efforts.

4.1.3 Legal Framework:
To create a new and stronger legal framework, or operate within existing ones is vital
to maritime security. Domestic legislative framework, which supports maritime
security demands and promotes the international order is very important. However,
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ineffective implementation has remained a challenge in the region (Ukeje & Ela, 2013;
Gopal, 2022). Nigeria’s DB project could be seen as having a substantial legal
framework/backing for its operations, especially, with respect to instituting
appropriate legal proceedings against wrongdoers or culprits. Apart from some
international laws backing prosecution of offenders, for example; UNCLOS, SUA,
among others, which are obligatory, the recent Suppression of Piracy and Other
Maritime Offenses (SPOMO) Act., 2019, put in place by the Nigerian government,
stands out as an overarching domestic legal framework backing the DBP’s operations.
The SPOMO Act. equally provides for prosecution of perpetrators, for example; since
the signing into law, 10 pirates have been prosecuted and given sentences after their
arrest through the DBP’s joint operation with the Nigerian Navy (NN) (NIMASA,
2019). This alludes to the point of Ukeje & Ela, 2013, that, “no other GoG country
boasts of any significant coastguard or naval capability to constitute effective
deterrence or countermeasure against growing maritime crimes apert from Nigeria,
and to a lesser extent Angola.

4.1.4 Adequate Human Resources:
The number of personnel engaged in the Deep Blue project so far appears to be
insufficient, especially when one considers the number of coastal zones, as well as
inland waters that make up Nigeria’s maritime domain that need to be covered at an
operational level. The DBP’s operations are concentrated majorly within the Lagos
coastal zone and yet to be operational in some other zones, for example; Akwa-Ibom,
Bayelsa, Delta, Edo, among others, hence, the need to open up the C4i contact point
in other coastal zones, engage and deploy more personnel to the zones to effectively
cover the vast Nigeria’s coastline, and particularly, the creeks, where most maritime
criminality emanate. According to Nnadi et al., 2016, there was a significant variation
in piracy and armed robbery attacks in the Gulf of Guinea between 2002 and 2015,
with the highest occurring in Nigeria, particularly, Lagos ports and anchorages. This
could be the reason for the DBP’s focus on the Lagos coastal zone in the meantime.
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However, the DB project is still new and will undoubtedly be subject to further
expansion in the region.

4.1.5 Alerting and Advanced Intelligence Systems:
The C4i Unit of the Deep Blue project has different sources of alerts as earlier
captured. However, the Digital Selective Calling (DSC) aspect, which enables vessels,
especially those in distress, to communicate or send messages to the shore station such
as the C4i Centre, needs to be further enhanced. The current DBP’s Intelligence
System, which has the capability of giving present and past history of vessels
movements appears to fit into the project’s scope considerably, in terms of detecting
maritime threats not involving hostilities. However, as a security project, which aims
at combating threats such as piracy, armed robbery and other transnational organized
crimes, there is a need for a higher technology in the DBP’s Intelligence System.
According to Ng et al., 2012, there is increasing pressure to detect and prevent the
occurrence of acts of hostilities through maritime surveillance and monitoring
operations. An efficient maritime security system has to augment surveillance and
monitoring operations with capabilities to reason and interpret situational information,
as well as transform the knowledge into actionable indicators. Suffice it to say that the
DBP should have a security technology capable of detecting vessels under attack for
quick identification and prompt actions by the C4i Centre personnel and the
intervention team. One of the key technologies that could be used in an integrated
maritime reasoning and monitoring system is the Dynamic Bayesian Reasoning and
Advanced Intelligent Networks (D’Brain), a system based on Bayesian Networks (Ng
et al., 2012), used to reason potential ship behaviours, especially, the behaviour of
pirate vessels in their prowling state (Dabrowski & de Villiers, 2015; Wen et al., 2019).

4.1.6 Assets of The Deep Blue Project:

56

The Deep Blue project has an array of assets for maritime security interventions which
are impressive. The marine, air and land assets of Nigeria’s DBP alludes to the point
of Joy, 2021, “each nation makes an effort to increase its defence capability in order
to address the security problems which arise from air, land and sea”. However,
addition of submarines to the existing assets of the DBP will enhance its defence
capabilities, inasmuch as the DBP is complimenting already existing maritime security
architecture in Nigeria, for example, the NAVY. According to Joy, 2021, submarines
are efficient, in that they immediately identify imminent attacks. On the other hand,
there is a need for more air, land and sea assets for the DBP, considering Nigeria’s
massive coastal zones the project needs to cover.

4.1.7 Unified Command Structure:
One of the unique features of Nigeria’s Deep Blue project is the synergy between the
civil and military authorities engaged in the project for the purpose of securing
Nigeria’s maritime domain. The DBP has two distinct command structures which take
care of administrative and operational needs of the project. According to Twrdy et al.,
2014, a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments is needed to meet today’s
maritime security challenges. Nonetheless, in order to avoid any futuristic civilmilitary misunderstandings that could impair the project’s sustainability, it is
important that the DBP’s command structure is unified to allow a firm grip of both
administrative and operational aspects of the project by the Designated Authority
(DA), in this case, the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency
(NIMASA), which is answerable to the international maritime community, for
example, the IMO, as well as the indigenous maritime stakeholders. Un-unified
command structure can lead to a conflict of interests, hence, could seriously affect the
DBP’s sustainability owing to the bureaucracies associated with both civil and military
modes of operations and lines of reportage, which Kasselmann, 2012, described as
leading to a prevalence of different perspectives. In other words, the DA – NIMASA,
should take full custody of operational assets of the DBP, to be able to deploy them
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during emergency situations, which are usually characterized by urgency, without
recourse to any chains of command that must be broken before assets are deployed to
salvage distress situations at sea. A functional organogram of the DBP is also
recommended, which spells out clear responsibilities and action lines of the different
agencies engaged in the project.

4.1.8 Integrated Communication/Common Terminology:
The modes of communication within the Deep Blue project are basic considerably.
However, as a security intervention project which deals with distress situations at sea,
a more globally recognized mode of integrated communication and use of common
terminology is needed. The Global Maritime Distress and Safety Systems (GMDSS),
is therefore recommended for the DBP, which according to the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC), 2017, is an internationally recognized distress
and radio communication safety system, and a crucial modern maritime
communication system (Lees & Williamson, 2020). Suffice to say, maritime distress
management requires transnational communication and understanding, as well as
coordination, hence, the need for a more globally recognized communication pattern
within the DBP.
According to Ilcerv, 2020, “the GMDSS architecture ensures that a ship in distress and
emergency situation anywhere in the world’s oceans must always be heard and able to
provide an answer”. For example; all ships engaged in international voyages are
expected to be equipped with the GMDSS, and also, have crews who are trained in the
GMDSS, and are expected to communicate using the terms during emergency
situations. GMDSS training for personnel engaged in the DBP is paramount, to enable
them to keep abreast with international technical, operational and communication
standards.
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4.1.9 Governance System, Multi-Agency/Multi-Layer Approach, and Cooperation
Between Stakeholders:
The governance system of Nigeria’s Deep Blue project, which appears to be a triministerial collaboration between the Federal Ministries of Transportation, Defense
and Police Affairs, under the supervision of the Office of the National Security Adviser
(ONSA), is a good development. According to Bueger and Edmunds, 2017, maritime
security is multifaceted, a holistic approach is therefore necessary, which focuses on
threats as shared problems, rather than sometimes notional or institutional distinctions
between actors. The above collaboration gave rise to the Integrated National Security
and Waterways Protection Infrastructure – The Deep Blue Project, which integrates
both civilian and military personnel who are specially trained on maritime domain
awareness, as well as military intervention personnel in order to ensure vigorous
approach towards securing Nigerian waterways and the GoG by extension. According
to the Somali National Maritime Strategy, 2022, it is the collective response, utilizing
all the instruments of national power, that will ensure maritime security, inasmuch as
the delineation of roles and functions are important aspects in functioning of individual
security entities.
This DBP’s arrangement, which brings together some agencies of the government
from the aforementioned ministries, for example; NIMASA, under the Ministry of
Transportation; the NAVY, ARMY, AIR FORCE, DSSS, under the ministry of
Defense and the NPF under the Ministry of Police Affairs, alludes to the point of Feldt
et al., 2013, on, “Comprehensive Approach”, where more than one authority is
engaged to contribute to maritime security, rather than a sectoral approach, which has
only limited success. The maritime skills developed over time, and through a
combination of experiences, common exercise, common set of rules and common
operations by the civil and military community are tagged “enablers” (Feldt et al.,
2013). However, as earlier pointed out, there is need to ensure DBP’s sustainability
through a uniform structure, managed by DA-NIMASA, which handles both
operational and administrative aspects of the DBP, in order to meet global best
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practices of swift and efficient emergency responses and asset deployments, as well as
devoid of unwarranted bureaucracies. The multi-layer approach to the DBP seems, at
least, very considerable, particularly, with respect to asset deployments which aim to
cover air, land and sea.
According to Papa, 2013, as cited by Ringsberg & Cole, 2020, “lack of consultation
with stakeholders acts as a barrier to compliance”. The establishment of the
Industry/NIMASA Joint Working Group is a boost to the Deep Blue project. It alludes
to the point of Ringsberg & Cole, 2020, “a maritime security stakeholder network,
where all resources and knowledge about security culture are made available”.
According to NIMASA, 2020, the objective of the Joint Working Group is to
accelerate efforts to tackle maritime security threats through facilitating stakeholders’
interaction, as well as pursuing projects through mutual collaboration and enhancing
transparency between government and industry in addressing shared goal of
permanent prevention of piracy and armed robbery in Nigerian waters and by
extension, the Gulf of Guinea region. In addition, this JWG will among other benefits,
create room for stakeholders’ participation and contributions, especially, with respect
to assets for operation enhancement.

4.1.10 Point of Contact, Action Plan Development and Accurate Incident Statistics:
The DBP’s C4i Centre appropriately serves as the PoC as obtained in different
jurisdictions. However, there is need for equipping the Centre with some latest
technologies for maritime security management and operations in addition to the
existing equipment, to guarantee more efficient real-time Watchkeeping and necessary
actions by personnel engaged in the Centre. More importantly, the personnel engaged
in the C4i Centre should be able to order for asset deployment in emergency or distress
cases independently, owing to the emergencies associated with such situations. The
newly developed Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) of the C4i Centre captures most
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action plans of the DBP. However, a more detailed SOP, which streamlines various
aspects of the project is needed.

The statistics of incidents, as well as events are properly captured in the C4i Centre by
both manual and electronic logging, which is in sync with most best practices around
the globe.

Figure 16. DBP Tactical Communication between C4i Centre and Assets. Source: (NIMASA C4i).
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Table 8. Summary of Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats
(SWOT) within Nigeria’s DBP.
Strengths:


Good

Weaknesses:
Domain Multi-sensor

Maritime

Awareness (MDA) capability.



system

Lack of internationally recognized Need for the
distress communication pattern.

integration, etc.


Good Point of Contact.

The C4i Centre.

GMDSS

and

training.


Insufficient

technology

or Advanced

Intelligence system for handling technology


Substantial legal frameworks for SPOMO

Act.,

threats involving hostilities and needed

NIMASA Act.,

operations.

for

pirates

cyberattacks.

SUA, etc.

detection

and

Cybersecurity


Considerable air, land and sea SMVs,
SMHs,
assets for response.

SMAs,

within the DBP.

UAVs,

Armured



Vehicles.

Limited

operational

coverage within Nigeria.

area

or Concentration
in Lagos coastal
zone.



Good

system “Comprehensive
multi-agency approach”. Feldt

governance

including

cooperation, civil and military et al., 2013.
partnership.


NIMASA/Industry Joint Working Stakeholders’
participation and
Group (JWG) establishment.
contribution.

62

Opportunities:


Threats:

Model for adoption in the Gulf of In addition to the 
Guinea,

particularly,

on existing

security

command

structure Need to avoid

allowing the DA-NIMASA take full civil-military

asset/personnel deployment for Yaoundé
maritime

Un-unified

grip of the DBP, especially, custody bureaucracies

real-time architecture.

of assets.

interests.

response.



Stakeholders’
compliance

and conflict of

enlightenment, Asset/technical
and

Sustainability plan for the DBP and Roadmap
critical assets maintenance.

contribution contributions by

the

DBP’s

sustainability.

towards overall maritime security stakeholders is a
efforts.

for

boost.

4.2 The Gulf of Guinea (GoG) Multi-Jurisdictional, Bilateral/Multilateral SPC
and Asset Contribution:
The multi-jurisdictional, bilateral/multilateral approaches to maritime security in the
Gulf of Guinea is a welcome development in many respects. However, the lack of
adequate joint operations between member states and asset contribution from each
state towards effective joint operations makes the Yaoundé architecture more of a
theory than practical. On the other hand, the non-binding Code of Conduct’s
implementation has been slow, particularly, owing to the delayed operationalization
of the MICC, hence, the need for greater political will (Osinowo, 2015). Lack of
interoperability, political will, capacity, as well as information sharing agreements are
part of the challenges which encumber joint patrols (Cheney-Peters, 2015). According
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to Hassan and Hasan, 2017, there is growing consensus on the need to jointly respond
and tackle the problem. Collective vigilance of the maritime domain of regional
countries can lead to successful suppression of piracy. Joint anti-piracy operation,
common surveillance procedure, as well as joint operational coordination capabilities
are necessary to facilitate an effective maritime security operation via a regional
security system.
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Chapter 5.
5.1 Conclusion and Recommendations.
The Gulf of Guinea maritime threats constitute a collective challenge to all the
stakeholders, both in the region and internationally. Regional cohesion and interaction
still leave much to be desired (Osinowo, 2015; Potgieter, 2012). According to Ukeje
& Ela, 2013, poor preparedness and inability to acknowledge and confront shared
maritime challenges and threats are part of the key features of current maritime
security challenges in the GoG. An integrated multidimensional approach which
strengthens maritime security is urgently needed in order to combat maritime crimes,
especially, piracy, in the Gulf of Guinea (Hassan & Hasan, 2017). Limitation of
facilities/infrastructure calls for cooperation between maritime stakeholders (Kusume
et al., 2021), hence, the need for stakeholders within the GoG to adopt the DBP system
towards adequate asset/personnel contribution and coordination for maritime security
in the region.

Significantly, since the inception of the Deep Blue project, there has been a drop in
the rate of maritime criminality in Nigeria. The integrative nature of the DBP and
available assets makes it stand out as a laudable maritime security intervention project
within the Gulf of Guinea by the Nigerian government, inasmuch as there exist some
aspects of the project that needs standardization and improvement. For example; the
interview conducted in the DBP’s C4i Centre showed the summary of piracy and
robbery incidents handled in the Centre from inception to date as follows;


Year 2019 = 33



Year 2020 = 33



Year 2021 = 6



Year 2022 (Q1) = 0
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Figure 17. A cluster of piracy events in Nigeria’s EEZ in 2019. Source: (NIMASA C4i Centre).

According to the ICC IMB annual reports, 2021, on actual and attempted piracy and
armed robbery attacks against ships in Nigeria for the same periods shows almost the
same figures (See Appendices 1-4);


Year 2019 = 35



Year 2020 = 35



Year 2021 = 6



Year 2022 (Q1) = 0
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Fig. 18. Global incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships 2021. Source: (ICC
IMB).

The above map and chart from NIMASA C4i Centre and ICC IMB respectively, shows
the status of incidents in years 2019 and 2021, which depicts a downward trend or
reduction in incidents. Prior to 2019, or the commencement of Nigeria’s Deep Blue
project, there were high figures in incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships.
For example, there were 33 incidents in 2017, and 48 incidents in 2018 (ICC IMB,
2021). The high incidents and similar figures in the years 2019 and 2020 could be
attributed to the period during which the DBP’s intervention team, as well as assets
and other operational equipment were being assembled.

The DBP/Nigerian Navy joint operation successfully apprehended ten (10) sea pirates
in May, 2020, for hijacking a Chinese fishing vessel, FV Hai Lu Feng II. The pirates
have since been sentenced to 48 years each in prison, under the Suppression of Piracy
and Other Maritime Offenses Act., which gives legal backing to the Nigeria’s DBP
towards speedy prosecution of criminals in the Nigerian maritime domain, and
ensuring an end to illegalities and threats within Nigerian waters and the Gulf of
Guinea by extension (NIMASA, 2021). Suffice it to say, this shows how the DBP is
tackling existing security challenges in Nigeria’s maritime domain, as well as the GoG
by extension.
Also, the impact of Nigeria’s Deep Blue project has been acknowledged by the
international maritime community. The IMO’s Secretary-General, Mr. Kitack Lim,
during the 2020 G7++ Friends of the Gulf of Guinea London Technical Plenary,
commended the Nigerian government and NIMASA for the launch of the DBP, which
according to him, shows commitment to fight against piracy. The NIMASA
DBP/Stakeholders’ JWG has equally been commended by the international body.
Also, the ICC IMB in its 2021 annual report, thanked in a special way, the Nigerian
authorities, particularly, NIMASA and the Nigerian Navy, for continued and prompt
information, action and valuable inter-agency cooperation in the fight against piracy
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and armed robbery against ships in Nigeria, and equally urged continued cooperation
from other West African authorities/navies in the region.

5.2 Recommendations:
It is recommended that Nigeria’s Deep Blue project serves as a model for the Gulf of
Guinea littoral states towards a robust maritime security for the entire region. This
recommendation is with particular reference to a common coordination Centre,
probably, the Nigeria’s DBP C4i Centre, owing to the strategic location of Nigeria in
the GoG, and more importantly, adequate asset and personnel contribution,
coordination and deployment for enhanced sea patrols within the jurisdictions of the
Gulf of Guinea member states, for prompt response(s) to distress emergencies like
piracy, armed robbery against ships, and other forms of maritime criminalities within
the region. One country cannot defend international threats. It needs cooperative
measures and a combination of countries’ powers, hence, the reason for joint patrol
and training by some countries (Joy, 2021).

According to ICC IMB, 2020, the substantial drop in the number of incidents in the
Straits of Malacca in recent times was due to the increased and aggressive patrols by
littoral states’ authorities within the region. This is undoubtedly an important
consideration that needs to be taken onboard in making recommendations on how to
improve maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. On the other hand, according to the
Somali National Maritime Strategy, 2022, maritime threats have significant landbased dimensions, hence, land-based actors and capabilities are equally as important
to maritime security as the specialized maritime capability usually associated with
institutions and maritime operations. Suffice to say that the DBP’s land, sea and air
asset capabilities stand as a good model. The GoG region can adopt this system of
adequate assets and constant patrols, with each state covering its maritime domain
adequately and liaison with other member states through a central reporting system in
the form of an Interregional Coordination Centre (ICC) as suggested by the IMO. This
is similar to the Information Fusion Centre (IFC) in Singapore, a common information
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feed operating system, for the participants of the Malacca Straits Patrol and Eye-inthe-Sky (Cheeney-Peters, 2015).

There will be greater demand for maritime security capabilities to achieve increased
investment and growth in the Blue Economy. Working with a broad range of actors,
including building capacities, helps to enforce rule of law and maritime sovereignty,
countering piracy, illegal fishing, trafficking networks and maintaining good order at
sea (Voyer et al., 2018; Neignes, 2021). It is important that the GoG states makes
available their assets/personnel capabilities for maritime security, and where
necessary, procure more maritime security assets to compliment that of Nigeria’s DBP
towards a comprehensive coverage of the entire GoG region, with each state patrolling
and policing their maritime boundaries and ensuring swift action when alerted of any
security breach in her maritime domain. Maritime security asset declaration by each
GoG member state, especially, the littoral states, will equally enable a full knowledge
of assets and response capabilities of each littoral state within the GoG and the
possibility of tagging those assets for ease of identification, deployment and tracking.

Nowadays reality is how the growing globalization, as well as information and
communication technology (ICT), have affected and boosted every part of our lives
(Mahmood et al., 2019). Governments, industries and academia turn to Internet of
Things (IoT), including Radio Frequency Identification (RFID), for security purposes
(Chen & Jin, 2012). As of today, the US Department of Energy Office of Scientific
and Technical Information has developed a Marine Asset Security and Tracking
(MAST) system, which works with sensor data from a radio frequency tag by different
methods (Hanson et al., 2008). The MAST can be adapted into the GoG collective
maritime security efforts, to enable tagging and ease of identification and deployment
of any maritime security asset within the GoG in close proximity to incident locations
in real-time, as well as having response team from each state take responsibility of
actions within their jurisdiction and report to the central coordination Centre, in which
the Nigeria’s DBP C4i Centre is suggested. The integration of IoT into the GoG
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collective maritime security efforts, will among other things, help the region overcome
maritime cybersecurity challenges and be prepared for any eventual full automation of
ships or shipping operations.
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